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Conner v. State of Nevada, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 49 (June 26, 2014)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: JUROR CHALLENGE 
 
Summary: 
 
The Court determined three issues: 1) whether, despite there being sufficient evidence to 
sustain a conviction, the conviction may stand where the State engages in discriminatory jury 
selection; 2) how a convicted defendant may sufficiently demonstrate that it is more likely than 
not that the State engaged in purposeful discrimination; and 3) the responsibilities of the district 
court when ruling on a Batson objection. 
 
Disposition: 
 
After considering all relevant circumstances, a conviction may be overturned upon a 
showing that the State more likely than not struck at least one prospective juror because of race, 
even if the evidence would ordinarily be sufficient to support the conviction. A defendant may 
meet this burden using the following considerations: (1) the similarity of answers to voir dire 
questions given by jurors who were struck and those of another race who remained; (2) disparate 
questioning by prosecutors of struck jurors and those of another race who remained; (3) the 
prosecutors’ use of jury shuffling; and (4) evidence of historical discrimination in jury selection. 
In addition, the district court must undertake a “sensitive inquiry” into both circumstantial and 
direct evidence available, as well as “all relevant circumstances,” before ruling on a Batson 
objection.  
 
Factual and Procedural History: 
 
On June 2, 1985, neighbors heard Beth Jardine enter her Las Vegas apartment with a 
man. The next day, a maintenance man found Jardine’s nude body in her apartment. She had 
been bludgeoned to death. Forensic tests eliminated Metro Police’s prime suspect, and the case 
went cold until 2006, when DNA tests were performed from vaginal swabs taken before 
Jardine’s autopsy. The DNA matched Charles Reese Connor through the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Combined DNA Index System. Conner’s fingerprints were then compared to 
those recovered from a lamp and bedsheet in Jardine’s apartment and determined to match.  
 Conner initially denied any knowledge of the incident, but eventually confessed and told 
detectives he hit Jardine with a hammer. At the time, detectives had not told Conner that the 
weapon used was a hammer. At trial, Conner admitted that he murdered Jardine but contended 
that it was not premeditated or committed during perpetration of sexual assault because the sex 
was consensual. Dr. Alane Olson, a Clark County medical examiner, testified that based on her 
independent review of the original autopsy report, Jardine had between 20 and 25 injuries to her 
head and neck. After hearing all the evidence, a jury rendered a guilty verdict against Conner for 
two counts of sexual assault and one count of first-degree murder, and Conner was sentenced to 
death.  
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 Conner contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual 
intercourse was not consensual or that the murder was willful, deliberate, or premeditated. He 
also argues that the district court erred by overruling his Batson objection during jury selection.  
 Before Conner’s trial, the district court narrowed the venire to 32 prospective jurors. The 
State exercised nine peremptory challenges, using six of them to remove minority members from 
the juror pool. After Conner alleged that these challenges established a pattern of racial 
discrimination, the state provided a race-neutral response to the six challenges, citing either 1) a 
change of heart about the death penalty between their questionnaire and voir dire questioning, or 
2) the outright inability to proscribe the death penalty.  
 Conner challenged the State’s race-neutral reasons with specific regard to Juror 157, and 
asked for specific race-neutral explanations for the challenges for each of the six jurors. The 
State them addressed each member individually, but Conner was not given any opportunity to 
respond. Without making any specific findings as to each challenged veniremember, the district 
court denied Conner’s Batson challenge and left the courtroom.  
 
Discussion: 
 
In assessing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, “a reviewing court must consider all 
of the evidence admitted by the trial court, regardless whether that evidence was admitted 
erroneously.”2 Because a rational juror could conclude that nonconsensual sex occurred and that 
Conner deliberately and with premeditation intended to kill Jardine, we reject Conner’s argument 
that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. 
 However, where there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, that conviction 
cannot stand where the State engaged in discriminatory jury selection. An equal-protection 
discrimination challenge to the exercise of a peremptory challenge is evaluated under the 3-part 
Batson test: First, the opponent of the challenge must make out a prima facie case of 
discrimination. Second, the proponent must assert a neutral explanation for the challenge. Third, 
the trial court must decide whether the opponent of the challenge has proved purposeful 
discrimination.3 Although in this case, only the third part of the Batson test is at issue, a 
defendant must meet its burden of proving prima facie discrimination using considerations that 
demonstrate it is more likely than not that the State engaged in purposeful discrimination. Some 
possible considerations include: (1) the similarity of answers to voir dire questions given by 
jurors who were struck and those of another race who remained; (2) disparate questioning by 
prosecutors of struck jurors and those of another race who remained; (3) the prosecutors’ use of 
jury shuffling; and (4) evidence of historical discrimination in jury selection.4 
 Under part 3 of the Batson test, the district court “must undertake a sensitive inquiry into 
such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available” and consider all relevant 
circumstances before ruling on the objection. This inquiry certainly includes giving the 
defendant an opportunity to challenge the race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge as 
pretextual.  
 In this case, Conner challenged the State’s race-neutral explanation specifically with 
regard to Juror 157. Following the challenge, the State gave two new explanations, both of which 
“reeks of afterthought” and are belied by the record. A race-neutral explanation that is belied by 
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the record is evidence of purposeful discrimination. Furthermore, because the district court judge 
overruled Conner’s objections, swore in the jury, and left the courtroom, all the while preventing 
Conner from responding to the race-neutral explanations offered by the State, the district court 
failed to undertake a proper Batson objection inquiry.  
 In a concurring opinion, attention is also brought to Dr. Alane Olson’s testimony 
introduction of the statements and opinions of another doctor’s autopsy report. The Sixth 
Amendment prohibits the State from introducing testimonial evidence through surrogate 
testimony, and in the event of a retrial, the State must carefully consider possible Confrontation 
Clause issues.  
 
Conclusion: 
 
There was sufficient evidence presented at trial for a reasonable juror to support the 
conviction. However, applying the 3-part Batson objection test, the district court committed clear 
error in its ruling on Conner’s Batson objection by preventing him from responding to the race-
neutral challenge explanations offered by the State. Therefore, because this error is structural, the 
judgment of conviction is reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.  
